. With ongoing climate change, annual precipitation, soil moisture and runo are likely to decrease, while rising temperatures could increase evaporative demand in large parts of the region 10 ( Fig. 1 ). e past decade saw rapid growth in research and policy interest in natural resource scarcity, with water-energy-food interdependencies increasingly framed as a nexus, or resource trilemma. e Bonn nexus conference in 2011 11 is notable in this process of recognizing the complex interactions between sectors and resource systems, and the need to minimize the trade-o s and risks of adverse cross-sectoral impacts 11, 12 . e nexus is increasingly prominent on policymakers' agendas, partly in relation to the post-2015 agenda for the sustainable development goals 13 . e private sector was another early promoter of the nexus concept 14 owing to growing associated risks a ecting production security along supply chains, such as (but not exclusively) for water 15 . In southern Africa, for example, South African brewers SABMiller are seeking better approaches to handling trade-o s between water, energy and food by attempting to make business decisions through a resource nexus lens 16 . Strong interdependencies on a range of scales give rise to a large number of trade-o s and co-bene ts, according to the heterogeneous con gurations of societal uses of water across river basins and aquifers. e region's many transboundary basins require actions among upstream and downstream water uses to be reconciled between countries.
Previous nexus studies have concentrated on global interdependencies 17 , problem framing 18 or case studies of speci c systems such as islands 19 and irrigation and hydropower production 20 . Here, we examine southern Africa's nexus from the perspective of climate and modify Ho 's nexus framework 11 , which integrates global trends (drivers) with elds of action, to highlight the role of climate as a driver (Fig. 2) . Climate encompasses average (that is, 30-yr) conditions, variability over years to decades (that is, as observed) and anthropogenic climate change. In terms of the nexus, we consider the main elements of intraregional links in water-energy-food at a national level, while highlighting connections on the river basin scale and drawing attention to case studies of the many examples of speci c trade-o s and synergies 21 . We base our review on published studies, complemented by empirical analysis of available national-level data on climate, water resources, crop production, trade and GDP. We rst consider national-level exposure of water, energy and food production to climate variability in aggregate economic terms and analyse the relationship between interannual and multiyear climate variability and economic activity, focusing on GDP and agricultural production. We then outline the potential for seasonal climate forecasting in areas with high forecasting skill and socially and economically important nexusrelated activities, and summarize studies that model the impact of anthropogenic climate change on elements of the nexus. Finally, we describe three key intraregional mechanisms for balancing nexus components, and conclude by identifying knowledge gaps in southern Africa's climate and water-energy-food nexus.
National-level exposure of nexus sectors to climate
We characterize exposure as the interaction between characteristics of the climate system (particularly interannual rainfall variability) and a country's dependence on climate-sensitive economic activities such as the share of agriculture in GDP, the proportion of rainfed agricultural land and the energy contribution from hydroelectric sources ( Table 1 ; Fig. 3 ). South Africa's GDP is larger than that of the other 12 southern African economies combined. e direct contribution of agriculture to the economy is lowest (<10%) in South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland, Namibia, Angola and Lesotho, 13% in Zimbabwe and more than 20% in the other countries. If agricultural processing were included in agricultural GDP, the shares would be substantially larger in most, if not all, SADC countries. e share of cropland equipped for irrigation is low in most of the region, with the exception of Madagascar, South Africa and Swaziland (Table 1) .
e contribution of hydropower to energy production is very high overall ( Fig. 3 ), but varies considerably across the region, from 1.5% in South Africa to more than 30% in Madagascar, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, and to almost 100% in DRC, Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia. Reliable electricity production is at risk during prolonged droughts and also during extreme ood events, when dam safety is an additional risk. More than 90% of South Africa's energy generation is coal-based 22 , well above the rest of the region. Coal-red power plants with wet cooling systems consume far more water than most other energy technologies 22 . us, South Africa's main energy utility, Eskom, uses about 2% of the country's freshwater resources, mainly for coal-red power stations 23 . Coal mining and energy generation from coal both substantially impact water quality and availability 24 . To reduce these impacts, Eskom has implemented a dry-cooling system in two existing and all new power stations 25 , enabling a 15-fold reduction in water use.
Overall, there are strong contrasts (Table 1) in energy (8-84% of energy consumption imported) and food (5-90% of cereal food imported) self-su ciency, and in the intensity of freshwater use, expressed as freshwater withdrawals relative to total actual renewable water resources (TARWR; 0.1-24%). Countries facing most water shortage, expressed as share of TARWR withdrawn (Table 1) , are South Africa (24%), Swaziland (23%) and Zimbabwe (21%), well within categories de ned as physically water scarce (ratio larger than 20% 26 ). We interpret this indicator with caution, noting its failure to capture the complex spatial and temporal distribution of water, political economic access, di erences in water needs and socioeconomic capacity to support e ective water utilization 27, 28 . Subnational areas of high demand relative to availability include southern Malawi, Namibia and Botswana. Low ratios of water withdrawal to TARWR (such as 0.05% in DRC 28 ) could also indicate economic water scarcity owing to inadequate investments to harness and deliver water.
e cereal import dependency ratio (Table 1) re ects the importance of imports for the volume of grains available for consumption in the country (that is, production + imports − exports). It is particularly high for the small countries of Swaziland and Lesotho, and more strikingly so for larger nations such as Botswana (90%), Namibia (65%) and Angola (55%). Dependency ratios are lowest in Zambia and Malawi. Total food aid received by the region (260,000 tons in 2012; Supplementary Fig. 1 ) was equivalent to about 2-3% of food imported by the region from the rest of the world (9 million tons in 2008). us, chronic and episodic food insecurity remain important problems in the region. e causes are numerous and, at the household and individual level, are dominated by poverty, environmental stressors and con ict, o en underpinned by structural elements in the lives of communities, intensi ed by sudden shocks that can be climate related such as decrease in cereal availability and food price spikes 29, 30 .
Climate signals in nexus sectors
Multiyear rainfall variability in southern Africa is higher than in many other parts of the world 31, 32 . Interannual variability, expressed as the coe cient of variation (COV), is not particularly high on national scales: <20% for most countries, except for Botswana and Namibia, the driest two countries (Fig. 3 ). However, rainfall shows much greater local variability (local COV exceeds 20% across much of the SADC region), strong seasonality and a range of multi-annual to decadal Table 1 ). Linear trends during the past two decades show varied behaviour; three countries with wetting trends above 20% of the long-term mean annual rainfall (Botswana, Namibia and Zambia) and Tanzania with a drying trend of 21% (Supplementary Table 1 ). National-level analysis is likely to obscure local trends and the results are highly sensitive to the period chosen for analysis, particularly in regions with strong multi-annual variability.
National variations in rainfall and temperature have been found to exert major in uence on agricultural production in all of SSA, but with considerable regional heterogeneity in the response to rainfall 34 . Another study for SSA used panel regressions to explore the e ects of temperature and precipitation variability on countrylevel economic growth indicators, and found drought was the most signi cant climate in uence on GDP per capita growth 35 . We use correlation analysis to explore, for each country, the associations between annual rainfall and national economic activity (GDP annual growth rate) and agricultural production (all cereals and maize -the most signi cant crop in the region). Fi een-year sliding correlations are used to examine the temporal stability of associations between variables (see Supplementary Information). ere are no statistically signi cant relationships between annual rainfall and GDP growth rate (Supplementary Table 2 ). Correlation of rainfall with total production of cereals and maize shows three countries with signi cant relationships at the 1% level and three at the 5% level (although for DRC it is negative and possibly spurious). e average sliding correlations are somewhat higher (Supplementary Table 3 ). Time series data of hydropower production are neither publically available nor easily comparable between sites/countries, making it di cult to assess the importance of climate variability as a driver of energy production uctuations. A study of the e ects of modied reservoir operation on downstream environmental ows of the Zambezi shows considerable variability in observed hydropower production at three sites, but does not consider the role of climate 36 . Electricity insecurity is known to negatively a ect total factor productivity and labour productivity of small and medium-sized enterprises, but the relationship is not simple, with di erences between countries and measurement e ects 37 . Studies of speci c events highlight the major consequences of drought-induced reductions in electricity production 38 . Ref. 18 cites examples of drought impact on the Kariba Dam (Zambezi Basin) during 1991-1992, resulting in estimated reductions of US$102 million in GDP and US$36 million in export earnings; and Kenya, where, during 2000, a 25% reduction in hydropower capacity resulted in an estimated 1.5% reduction in GDP. A review of the economics of climate change in Tanzania pro led the consequences of the 2003 drought, which brought the Mtera Dam reservoir levels close to the minimum required for electricity generation 39 . is prompted the Tanzania Electric Supply Company to approach a private provider to use gas turbine units at huge cost. A more recent World Bank estimate put costs of power shortages in Tanzania at US$1.7 million per day, with an average 63 days per year with power outages 39 .
Early warnings from the climate system
Given the links between climate and the water-energy-food nexus in the region, seasonal forecast information can play an important role in guiding nexus-related decision making, depending on forecast skill and utility. Seasonal to interannual variability in southern Africa is high, but so is its predictability relative to other regions, depending on location, time of year 40 and phase of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation 41 (ENSO). is can be seen by considering the association (Fig. 4a ) between NINO3.4 sea surface temperaturesas a representation of ENSO -and gridded rainfall over southern Africa south of 15° S (ref. 41) . A state-of-the-art coupled oceanatmosphere model has some skill in predicting seasonal (December to February, DJF) rainfall over the region at a one-month lead time (DJF forecasts produced in November; Fig. 4b shows areas with statistically signi cant correlation 41 ; see Supplementary Information). Stronger ENSO associations and the best model performance are found for maximum temperatures ( Supplementary Fig. 2 ). e areas where ENSO impacts signi cantly and where forecast skill levels are relatively high include the river basins of the Limpopo, Orange, Umgeni and lower Zambezi.
e Limpopo Basin is particularly notable as having both high economic productivity and strong ENSO associations and forecast skill. Comprising 408,800 km 2 , and including the countries of South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, the Limpopo Basin is one of the most water stressed in SSA, and features some of the largest urban conglomerations (including Pretoria, Johannesburg, Gaborone, Francistown and Bulawayo). Irrigation comprises more than 50% of basin water use and other infrastructure (including industry and mining) is also highly dependent on basin water.
ere are signi cant mining activities in the basin -particularly in South Africa and Zimbabwe 42 -that generate major water pollution downstream 43 . e Limpopo is heavily regulated, with extensive plans for further development.
Despite forecast skill and potential utility in economic productivity hotspots such as the Limpopo Basin, a comprehensive review of seasonal forecasting status in SSA identi ed persistent barriers in realizing the bene ts of forecast products, which were generally insu cient to inform response actions, such as production decisions and institutional actions 44 . If these barriers can be overcome, seasonal forecasting has the potential to contribute to anticipating uctuations in nexus sectors and could inform guidance on reservoir multi-use, water allocation, early targeting of or access to agricultural inputs and credit, design of interventions during food crises, and improvements to trade and agricultural insurance 45 .
Modelling nexus sectors in a changing climate
e challenges for the water-energy-food nexus posed by interannual variability occur in the context of a gradually changing climate. Even if an international agreement to limit global warming to 2 °C above pre-industrial conditions is successfully developed, climate models project signi cant changes that exceed the range of natural climate variability (Fig. 1) . According to the majority of climate models, most southern African countries will warm more than the global mean, with annual mean temperatures rising by 2 to 3 °C in most cases. Precipitation changes are more uncertain, with both increases and decreases possible. Nevertheless, for most countries the majority of models project decreases in annual precipitation, by 20% or more for some models and countries. Except for the southernmost countries, there is a tendency for models that project most warming to simulate stronger reductions in precipitation. Analysis of extreme precipitation in the climate models used for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report shows a marked delay in rainy season onset over most of the region and an early end to the season in parts of the region 46 . Most nexus studies for southern Africa have been motivated by climate change and assess biophysical impacts for speci c sectors, for example, rainfall and irrigation water availability on crop production, or river ow changes on hydropower generation. Some crop models simulate sizable yield losses for southern Africa 47 , suggesting that the region's food system could be particularly vulnerable to climate change 48 . However, di erences in climate scenarios, impact models, spatial and temporal scales, and processes represented restrict our ability to reliably de ne impacts for speci c sectors and, importantly, secondary e ects across the water-energy-food nexus. Nevertheless, an estimate of the range of potential impacts on maize yield (and the wide uncertainty range) can be determined from the 30-member ensemble of global gridded crop models run by the Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project 49 (see Supplementary Information). e simulated maize yield averaged across southern Africa decreases by 15.7 ± 16.3% (rain fed) and 8.3 ± 20.4% (irrigated) by the 2080s relative to the 2000s, that is, a median yield reduction with a substantial range of di erent outcomes. e wide range is owing to uncertainties in climate and in our understanding of crop response to climate change, particularly the role of increased atmospheric CO 2 concentration on photosynthesis. In the top ve southern African producers, median impacts are relatively small in the 2020s and 2050s, becoming more substantially negative by the 2080s, with a stronger level of agreement in the sign of change among simulations (Fig. 5) . Among these countries, rainfed cultivation is most negatively impacted, highlighting that water stress is an important limiting factor of crop yield in the region. Average crop water use decreases, resulting in a 5.9 ± 20.7% increase in estimated crop water productivity (Supplementary Information; Supplementary Fig. S3 ) by the 2080s.
An ensemble of global hydrological models driven by ve climate scenarios from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) shows reductions in annual discharge from 0 to 50% for the multimodel mean across much of southern Africa, excluding southwest Botswana 50 . River basin and water management models indicate higher risks for Zambezi hydropower generation 51 , while regional and global water and food models suggest lower runo raises risks for water and food security in southern Africa in general 52 . e economic dimensions of the nexus in southern Africa can be studied using general equilibrium models that translate biophysical impacts into economic outcomes. is approach simulates economies as adapting to shocks, albeit imperfectly, through market and resource adjustments. Incorporating economic adaptation generally leads to smaller impacts than those from biophysical studies. As global models rarely separate southern Africa from SSA, country-level studies are the region's main evidence base. Historical climate variability imposes high costs on low-income agrarian economies 53 and climate change is likely to have adverse e ects on food security 54 . Long-term changes in annual precipitation and temperature may have less impact than historical variability until 2050 4, 55 . Historical data show substantial variability in smallholder farm yields and incomes. Increased future variability of smallholder farm yields from climate change is therefore likely to increase the livelihood and food insecurity risks for farmers who are already at high risk 54 . Although most studies focus on agriculture, this is not always the main climate impact channel. For example, nexus studies nd that road damages from ooding and weather stress are equally or more important drivers of the economic losses associated with climate change in Mozambique and South Africa 56 .
More integrated multisector/country-level studies are needed to guide adaptation responses.
A second strand of economic research focuses on climate and energy policy. A high proportion of SADC greenhouse gas emissions are from South Africa due especially to its reliance on coal-red power. Curbing these emissions may reduce national income and employment, because nancing domestic renewable options requires higher electricity tari s 57, 58 . Li ing South Africa's restrictions on hydropower imports would reduce investment costs and economic losses 59 . Climate change will have considerable indirect impacts on electricity generation with positive feedbacks. Higher water and air temperatures make cooling processes in coal-red power plants less e ective and potentially reduce water availability during longer dry periods 24 ; this could result in an overall reduction of power plant e ciency and higher carbon emissions. In its climate change strategy, Eskom aspires to diversify its energy generation mix to lower-carbon-emitting technologies 60 . Solar photovoltaic and wind energy are considered to be the most viable renewable options in terms of water withdrawal and consumption compared with biofuel and hydropower 25 . Biofuels may reduce the region's imported fossil fuels and rural poverty, but have potential food security trade-o s 61 . e research indicates that continued climate change, economic development and urbanization will strengthen interdependencies in the water, energy and food nexus in southern Africa and that climate and associated energy policy will further reinforce the costs of trade-o s and complementarities across the nexus, especially if expansionist regional hydropower and biofuel strategies are adopted.
Intraregional instruments for the nexus
Southern Africa can be characterized as a single economic block of strongly interlinked economies where water, energy and food ow between producers and consumers, which also displays considerable heterogeneity in its natural resource endowments and infrastructure distribution, sociopolitical cohesion and economic development. For both the region and individual nations, this implies signi cant challenges in attempting to balance supply and demand while maintaining coherent policies towards integrated management of waterenergy-food resources. e region is well placed to transfer resources intraregionally to meet energy and food shortfalls. However, rising demand for electricity, food and water throughout southern Africa may sharpen the region's sensitivity to climate-induced shocks. Fi een transboundary river basins transect the region, including the large Congo and Zambezi basins, shared by nine and eight countries, respectively, as well as many smaller shared catchments. Surface catchments are underlain by an estimated 16 transboundary aquifers 62 . e origin of the southern African economic block can be tied to the dominant position of South Africa and its history alongside other ex-South African and British colonies such as Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia and Zambia. South Africa in particular has great cultural, economic and political in uence over its neighbours, making its role as a source (and sometimes a sink) of energy, water and food hegemonic 63 . is alliance and in uence is also shown through the SAPP (South Africa has 77% of SAPP's installed power supply capacity 64 ), the SADC and other agreements. In responding to the distribution of and demand for waterenergy-food resources, three key instruments have emerged. First, the SADC, based in Botswana, addresses how member countries sharing rivers might resolve water allocation priorities through a protocol on shared watercourses 65, 66 . e presence of signi cant water demands arising from irrigated agriculture and the Gauteng urban industrial complex in South Africa has led to relatively sophisticated water-sharing agreements such as the Joint Development and Utilization of the Water Resources of Komati River Basin 67 water-energy-food security strategies. South Africa and Zimbabwe, which have the largest numbers of dams, use these predominantly for irrigation and water supply, whereas Mozambique, which has one of the largest total dam capacities, concentrates on hydropower production (Supplementary Table 4 ). Notwithstanding these institutional and physical structures, in some instances water sharing still su ers from a lack of integration (particularly between agricultural and water institutions) and incomplete e orts to increase stakeholder participation and decentralize water management (ref. 69 , reviewing South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique). Coordination during ood events can also be challenging. For example, the persistent 2010-2011 summer rainfall in the Zambezi Basin resulted in high water levels in Lake Kariba. Opening of spillway gates raised downstream water levels, which increased ooding and compromised e ective reservoir management at Cahora Bassa farther downstream in Mozambique 70 . Second, the SAPP is a remarkable alliance of 12 energy-generating bodies from 12 countries interconnected through a grid to help smooth spatial and temporal shortfalls in electrical capacity. It was established in 1995 by the member governments of the SADC (excluding Mauritius) to develop an interconnected electrical system, coordinate and enforce common regional standards, harmonize relationships, develop expertise across member utilities and promote sustainable development 71 . e SAPP electricity-generating mix in 2012-2013 was 54,923 MW, comprising a signi cant proportion from hydropower (17.4%), but dominated by coal (72.9%). e network is intended to function as a competitive market in which surpluses and de cits are resolved via trades and negotiations, and therefore has the potential to serve as a bu ering mechanism for climate-induced river-basin-scale electricity insecurity.
ird, food trade in southern Africa naturally results from regional variability in production, especially of maize. Large and e cient producers in South Africa induce a trade surplus with other SADC members. Importantly, trade of agricultural products corresponds to signi cant transfers of embedded water resources, or 'virtual water trade' (VWT; see Supplementary Information). Water resources embedded in the regional food exports of South Africa and Zambia (0.9 and 1.2 km 3 in 2011, respectively; Fig. 6a ) 72 73 . is small percentage re ects the dominance of rainfed (green water) agriculture in the region. Although strong open trade is an important tool to alleviate climate-induced food de cits 74, 75 , and VWT openness tends to reduce undernourishment 76 , southern African countries have varying levels of trade connectivity and link strengths, both for intraand extra-regional food trade links. Informal border trade plays a crucial role in alleviating food shortages. Estimates suggest that 150,000-250,000 tonnes of maize ow from Mozambique to Malawi during years of good production in Mozambique and high demand in Malawi 77 . Informal traders are less encumbered by trade regulations than larger formal grain traders, and hence can respond to arbitrage opportunities more quickly 78 . us, the potential bene ts of food trade to alleviate production shocks are likely to be uneven across the region, and require further investigation.
One of SADC's main goals for regional integration is to promote trade across member countries. E orts are ongoing to reduce major existing barriers, such as trade regulations and lack of reliable transportation infrastructure 79 -notably via the protocol on trade 80 -including facilitation of customs processes and a regional infrastructure plan for the transport sector 81 . SADC is currently exploring opportunities for greater cross-sectoral coordination in the SADC climate change and green economy strategy (under revision at time of writing 82 ), in which key recommendations focus on implementations that will ensure actions do not take place in a single directorate. Such recommendations have arguably comprised the most demanding area of work for the strategy development, re ecting the importance of ensuring cross-sectoral coordination, as well as nding agreement on how to achieve it on the regional scale.
Conclusion and outlook
Climate plays an important role in determining medium-term water availability, potential agricultural production and some components of energy production and demand. Climate variability drives uctuations in water-energy-food elements with secondary e ects across the whole nexus (Fig. 2) . Exposure to climate variability and climate change are high across nexus sectors that include substantial areas of economic activity in southern Africa and there is strong evidence of the e ects of individual climate events. For example, South Africa experienced a 7% drop in GDP in the 1983 El Niño year, and climatic uctuations resulted in GDP variations of up to US$5 billion 3 . e 2000 oods in Mozambique led to devastating impacts on livelihoods, electricity supplies and basic infrastructure 83 . Yet our analysis of associations between rainfall, GDP and crop production using available data shows mostly weak and statistically insigni cant correlations in contrast to other studies for SSA based on panel regressions 34, 35 . is is likely to be partly a function of scale, where national and annual scales obscure stronger relationships that may exist at ner levels of analysis. Data availability (for example, absence of publically available hydropower production time series) and quality also play a role. e country climate estimates are o en based on sparse station coverage, particularly since the 1980s 84 , and recent scrutiny of GDP data for SSA has highlighted a lack of transparency in data sources and collection methods, lack of metadata and lack of detail on methods of aggregation 85 . is leads to di erences between GDP estimates, non-random errors, adjustments to historical data and inhomogeneity in time series. National statistical o ces are woefully under-resourced in SSA, while the need for good-quality data is paramount and urgent, to underpin reliable physical and economic modelling and detailed narrative of the causal links between climate and nexus sectors 86 . River ows in the region are strongly linked to seasonal rainfall and temperature variations, and the information reviewed here provides evidence that seasonal forecasting of river ows in some basins has application potential. However, the bene ts from seasonal forecasting for reducing net food and energy imports through enhanced agricultural and hydropower production/energy mix have yet to be studied and, even more importantly, implemented in practice. For the future, climate models show fairly strong agreement that the southern countries in the region may become drier and the secondary impacts, although very uncertain, are likely to be substantial across the waterenergy-food nexus.
Water, energy and food are linked across di erent scales in southern Africa. Spatial interdependence is high and climate anomalies can produce regional scale e ects, for example, ENSO-related droughts and river-basin-scale oods. At the national level, water and energy are closely coupled through signi cant hydropower production in several countries. Water use for biofuels and cooling for electricity generation remains relatively modest, except for cooling in South Africa. In South Africa, policies rarely cross sectoral boundaries of water and energy at all governance levels, yet integration of renewable technologies for pumping and heating has the potential to bene t mitigation and achieve expenditure savings 21 . Water and food links are strong, primarily through green water requirements in rainfed agriculture and some hotspots of blue (irrigation) water demand, which account for most freshwater consumption in the region. Food and energy links are growing due to increasing irrigation, mechanization and fertilization of agriculture, while biofuel development remains low. e rapidly increasing demand for energy by industry and mining, rapidly growing urban areas and agricultural intensi cation is likely to impose increasing strain on the water-energy-food nexus. At the regional level, nexus interdependencies are strong, due to multiple shared major river basins and aquifers, the SAPP powersharing infrastructure, and intraregional food and embedded water trade. ese links are enhanced by governance mechanisms such as the SADC, which has established protocols on shared water, energy and food security, the Southern Africa Regional Climate Outlook Forum, and initiatives on trade and the green economy.
Debate is ongoing about whether there is anything new about the nexus that distinguishes it from earlier integrative framings 87, 88 . Some argue that a nexus framing is better at uncovering more e ective approaches and methods for cross-sectoral integration by examining trade-o s and co-bene ts, and through linking disparate knowledge sets and improving governance 89 . However, entrenched vertically structured government departments and sector-based structures of agencies, policies and regulatory mechanisms complicate coordination, and remain challenges to cross-sectoral integration [87] [88] [89] . e political economy of governance and operation is further challenged by regional and intraregional institutional capacity and power imbalances. Our review suggests that climate change, combined with increasing demand associated with wider socioeconomic development pathways, will intensify interdependencies in the water-energy-food nexus, particularly shorter-term pressures associated with extreme events. We have outlined some of the main interdependencies and key regional institutional and policy structures in southern Africa. ere is a need to map these structures on ner scales, to understand and share insights into where trends and shocks have been managed e ectively in the past, and to identify measures that enhance successful cross-sectoral approaches. ere are some e orts in regional strategy and policy formulation to better achieve cross-sectoral coordination, but the modalities for attaining such coordination are still under debate. In a highly climate-sensitive environment such as southern Africa, emerging strategiessuch as those under the SADC -will bear fruit only if recognition of co-dependencies and inter-relationships in the nexus provides the basis for credible and well-monitored actions. 
Methods and data

Climate signals in the nexus
Our analysis draws from a range of global databases as follows. For rainfall we use CRU CY country average time series for 1901-2012 updated in ref. 1 . Detailed information on CRU CY quality control and notes on data interpretation can be found in relevant publications, but we note that Africa has generally very poor spatial and temporal coverage of rainfall stations and this is true for the CRU CY data (which are based on CRU TS 3.21), particularly before the 1930s and after roughly 1980 1,2 .
We use correlation analysis to explore the associations between annual rainfall and national economic activity (GDP) and agricultural production (total cereal and maize, the most significant crop in the region). Country level correlation coefficients between annual GDP percentage growth rate and agricultural production (calendar year), and rainfall (October year--1 to September current year). We use sliding correlations to explore further the temporal stability of associations between variables. Long--term averages, trend analysis based on linear regression, and temporal variability (coefficient of variation, CoV) are used for data description and analysis. The average, minimum and maximum of 15 year sliding correlations are presented.
Climate and southern Africa's water-energy-food nexus
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
Seasonal Forecasting
Coupled model data, as produced by the ECHAM4.5--MOM3--DC2 model 3 , are available from the data library of the International Research Institute for Climate and Society. The evaluation period for the ENSO link analysis and for the model hindcasts is the 30 years from 1982/83 to 2011/12. For both the ENSO and model skill work we use Kendall's tau to calculate the respective correlation fields, and apply Monte Carlo procedures to obtain the statistical significance of the associations. Downscaling to rainfall is done using the coupled model's 850 hPa geopotential height fields, while 850--500 hPa thickness fields are used to downscale to maximum temperatures.
Climate scenarios and crop impacts
Future climate change impact on crops are taken from the ISI--MIP archive, which comprises simulation results from six global gridded crop models driven by five global climate models from the CMIP5 archive under RCP 8.5 4 . Results presented here all include carbon fertilisation effects and are presented for rainfed and irrigated maize separately.
Virtual water trade
Virtual water trade (VWT) flows are estimated by combining bilateral agricultural trade data 5 with yearly estimates of these commodities' virtual water content (VWC) in each nation 6, 7 . VWT between each nation is obtained by multiplying the traded volume of a specific commodity by the VWC of this commodity in the country of export. The international trade of staple food products was obtained for 58 selected commodities (listed in ref. 5) made from five major crops (barley, corn, rice, soybean, and wheat) and three livestock products (beef, pork, and poultry). The items covered here account for about 70% of calorie supply in southern Africa (including 29% via maize, source: FAOSTAT Food Balance Sheets; data for year 2011, in Kcal/cap/day). We removed any divergence in the trade volumes reported between two nations by taking the average volume. In cases in which only one country reported a trade, we kept the reported trade value, and if no data were reported between two nations, we assumed that no trade was taking place between these two nations. VWC (kg water /kg product ) of raw crops is defined as the evapotranspiration during a cropping period (kg water /m 2 ) divided by the crop yield (kg crop /m 2 ). The VWC of unprocessed livestock products is defined as the water consumption per head of livestock (kg water /head) divided by the livestock production per head (kg meat /head). Water consumption per head includes VWC of feed consumed by each animal until slaughter, as well as drinking water and cleaning water used in livestock raising. The VWC value of each commodity for each year until 2001 was calculated using national crop yield time series 4 and evapotranspiration (ET) simulated with the H08 global hydrological model 7, 8 . The ET simulation used WATCH meteorological forcing data 9 , which cover the whole globe at 0.5° spatial resolution, from 1901 to 2001 at 6--h intervals. The cropland area 10 , irrigated area 11 , and crop type 12 were fixed circa year 2000 for which detailed data are available. However, ET simulation did account for yearly changes in national harvested area for each crop 7--9 . We used the yearly H08 VWC estimates from 1986 to 2001. . Mean, maximum and minimum correlations from 15, year sliding correlations significant at the 1% level are bold, and at the 5% level in italics. The mean of the sliding correlations was not tested for statistical significance.
